Regionalist Parties and the Mobilization of Territorial Difference in Germany by Hepburn, Eve & Hough, Dan
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regionalist Parties and the Mobilization of Territorial Difference
in Germany
Citation for published version:
Hepburn, E & Hough, D 2012, 'Regionalist Parties and the Mobilization of Territorial Difference in Germany'
Government and Opposition, vol 47, no. 1, pp. 74-96., 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2011.01351.x
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/j.1477-7053.2011.01351.x
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher final version (usually the publisher pdf)
Published In:
Government and Opposition
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Hepburn, E., & Hough, D. (2012). Regionalist Parties and the Mobilization of Territorial Difference in Germany.
Government and Opposition, 47(1), 74-96doi: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2011.01351.x
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
Eve Hepburn and Dan Houghgoop_1351 74..96
Regionalist Parties and the Mobilization
of Territorial Difference in Germany
WHEN SCHOLARS TALK ABOUT POLITICAL REGIONALISM, THE FEDERAL
Republic of Germany (FRG) is not normally the first country that
they look at. Although Germany is a federal state and since unifica-
tion has become more economically, politically and socially diverse, it
has not witnessed the rise of overt regionalist actors in the way that
states such as Canada, Spain, Italy and Belgium have. Indeed, the
German party system has continued to provide effective consensual
governments formed by political parties that have been able to
appeal to voters across the entire territory of the state. Most studies
subsequently appear to assume that political regionalism effectively
does not exist in Germany. This analysis neglects the persisting effects
of territory on German politics. In particular, it overlooks the key role
of regionalist parties in shaping the German party system to reflect
the distinct needs of their territorial constituencies.
Political parties in post-war Germany have traditionally been per-
ceived as motors of national integration and protectors of social
cohesion. This article argues, however, that the national-federal ori-
entation of parties did not prevent territorial cleavages from taking
root within the party system. These cleavages encapsulate a number
of dimensions that cut across traditional left–right thinking. Initially,
they were predominantly north–south, but with unification in 1990 a
new centre–periphery cleavage emerged, not only around regional
economic inequalities, but also on issues of culture and identity.1 New
and existing territorial cleavages have been used to cement the posi-
tion of two regionalist parties in Germany’s party system: the Bavarian
Christian Social Union (CSU) and, between 1990 and 2005, the
eastern German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS; the PDS
1 A. Staab, National Identity in Eastern Germany: Inner Unification or Continued Separa-
tion?, Westport, CT, Praeger, 1998; J. Grix and P. Cooke (eds), East German Distinctive-
ness in a Unified Germany, Birmingham, Birmingham University Press, 2003.
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mutated into the Left Party – Die Linke – in 2007, by which point it
had definitively ceased to be a regionalist party).2 A comparison of
these two parties and their territorial strategies enables us to develop
not just a greater understanding of the parties’ respective successes in
Bavaria and eastern Germany, but also of the general methods by
which regionalist parties cement their positions in national party
systems.
Both the Bavarian CSU and the eastern German PDS have sought
to represent the interests of their territories within the FRG.3 The
concept of ‘territorial interests’ has a number of dimensions, includ-
ing not only in constitutional and symbolic demands for more powers
and autonomy, but also in the form of economic and political con-
cessions from the state and representation in federal bodies. In par-
ticular, German regionalist parties have conceptualized and
constructed the issue of territory in different ways – one in national-
cultural terms, the other by developing a narrative of socio-economic
dislocation and enforced cultural adaptation. Yet, although there are
profound differences in the ideological orientation, voter base, eco-
nomic strategies and self-determination goals of these two parties,
they are united by their common desire to empower their territory in
Germany. This persistence of political regionalism raises an impor-
tant question: how were the CSU and PDS able to succeed in pursu-
ing their territorial interests in a federal party system seemingly
closed to ‘particularism’? In other words, what factors explain their
success?
2 Using precise terminology when analysing the development of the PDS and Left
Party can be difficult and cumbersome. This is largely because the party changed its
name from the PDS to the Left Party in the run-up to the 2005 election and then,
technically speaking, merged with another party (WASG) in 2007 – even though it kept
precisely the same name as it had in the period before. For the purposes of clarity and
consistency we use the term PDS throughout. We do this for the simple reason that we
are predominantly interested in discussing the PDS’s development during its existence
as an unambiguously regionalist political party (i.e. 1990–2005). For an analysis of the
PDS’s development into the Left Party see J. Olsen, ‘The Merger of the PDS and
WASG: From Eastern German Regional Party to National Radical Left Party?’, German
Politics, 16: 2 (2007), pp. 205–21.
3 C. Sutherland, ‘ “Nation, Heimat, Vaterland”: The Reinvention of Concepts by
the Bavarian CSU Party’, German Politics, 10: 3 (2001), pp. 13–36; D. Hough, ‘ “Made in
Eastern Germany”: The PDS and the Articulation of Eastern German Interests’, German
Politics, 9: 2 (2000), pp. 125–48.
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This article seeks to answer this question by exploring the ways in
which the CSU and PDS have sought to mobilize territorial difference
in post-war Germany. It begins with a theoretical discussion of politi-
cal regionalism and regionalist parties, in order to consider how the
CSU and PDS may be categorized. This entails an examination of the
core goals of the regionalist parties – in particular, a commitment to
territorial self-empowerment and the pursuit of territorial interests
(be they economic, political or cultural) at different levels of the
state. This section also explores several ‘determinants’ of regionalist
party success that have been put forward in the literature, with a view
to testing these determinants in these cases.
The subsequent section explores the two case studies in more
detail, accounting for the emergence and consolidation of the CSU
and PDS in their respective territories, the modernization and trans-
formation of these parties into multilevel political players, and their
efforts to influence politics at the centre. Following this analysis, we
test the determinants of success identified by several scholars in these
two cases. We also identify other factors that have contributed to the
success of these parties in Germany, including the federalist and
regionalist orientation of the parties and their development of part-
nerships and coalitions at the federal level and the weakness of
state-wide parties in playing the territorial card. The article then
concludes with a discussion of the future opportunities for regionalist
mobilization in the reformed German federal system.
REGIONALIST PARTIES IN GERMANY
Most analyses of sub-state regionalist parties do not include any from
Germany.4 This is a curious oversight, given that two of the most
successful regionalist parties in Europe operate(d) in the FRG: the
CSU and PDS. The CSU describes itself as a Bavarian party that seeks
to advance Bavarian interests and influence in the FRG, whose
lineage can be traced back to the Bayerische Patrioten (Bavarian
Patriots) in the mid-nineteenth century. Until the mid-2000s the PDS,
4 S. Newman, Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies: Mostly Ballots, Rarely Bullets, West-
port, CT, Greenwood, 1996; L. De Winter and H. Türsan (eds), Regionalist Parties in
Western Europe, London and New York, Routledge, 1998; L. De Winter, M. Gómez-
Reino and P. Lynch (eds), Autonomist Parties in Europe: Identity Politics and the Revival of
the Territorial Cleavage, Barcelona, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, 2006.
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meanwhile, was a protectionist party, seeking to protect and enhance
the interests of eastern Germans without demanding a reconfigura-
tion of state institutions. How might we categorize these parties? First
it is necessary to explain what we mean when we talk about region-
alism and regionalist parties.
One of the most authoritative accounts of regionalist parties is
offered by Lieven De Winter and Huri Türsan.5 In their landmark
study of ‘ethnoregionalist parties’, the authors identify two common
denominators uniting members of the regionalist party family: (1) a
sub-national territorial border and (2) an exclusive group identity.
These two aspects create a sense of community and a people united
by kinship, affinity and attachment that may be mobilized for political
ends.6 Regionalist parties seek to develop an identification with a
given territory, and to mobilize regional interests and resources
around it. The central aim of these parties is, according to Türsan,
the ‘political reorganisation of the national power structure’.7 De
Winter et al. offer a convincing explanation for the inexorable rise of
regionalist parties.8 They argue that parties representing regional or
local interests have been able to capitalize on latent popular discon-
tent with distant forms of authority and established political elites by
demanding more control over resources and decision-making. Along
with green parties and radical right parties, regionalist parties have
been among the main beneficiaries of voter alienation from, and
frustration with, mainstream state-wide parties in Western European
democracies. Recent literature in this area has sought to expand on
De Winter and Türsan’s pioneering study. Hepburn, for example,
argued that the common aim of regionalist parties should include
not only self-determination and the constitutional restructuring of
the state, but also the general aim of ‘territorial empowerment’,
which involves seeking to advance the political, socio-economic and
cultural interests of the territory.9 Others have also begun to look
beyond autonomy as their defining characteristic, as some regionalist
parties prefer to make territorial economic concessions, cultural
5 De Winter and Türsan, Regionalist Parties in Western Europe.
6 L. Snyder, Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, New York, Paragon House, 1990.
7 H. Türsan, ‘Introduction: Ethnoregionalist Parties as Ethnic Entrepreneurs’, in
De Winter and Türsan, Regionalist Parties in Western Europe, p. 6.
8 De Winter et al., Autonomist Parties in Europe, p. 14.
9 E. Hepburn, ‘Introduction: Re-Conceptualizing Sub-State Mobilization’, Regional
and Federal Studies, 19: 4–5 (2009), p. 482.
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recognition or linguistic rights their main goal.10 In short – and this
is a definition we follow – regionalist parties are characterized by
their concentration on defending regional interests; this is some-
thing that both the CSU and the PDS plainly do.
Yet regionalist parties clearly take on a variety of guises. In particu-
lar, Keating provides a useful overview of the various forms that
regional mobilization might take.11 He identifies several types of
‘bottom-up’ movements, including: ‘conservative regionalism’, which
defends regional traditions against the modernizing state; ‘bourgeois
regionalism’, which seeks to modernize and free itself from a tradi-
tionalist state; ‘left-wing progressive regionalism’, which endorses the
themes of democracy, equality and progress; ‘right-wing populist
regionalism’, which is opposed to the state draining its resources;
‘cultural regionalism’, based on the protection of local cultures or
languages; and ‘minority nationalism’, based on a historical home-
land and the desire for self-determination.12
Can the CSU and PDS indeed be characterized as regionalist
parties? And what kind of regionalism do they stand for? On the first
issue, the CSU and PDS (until 2005) both sought to represent a
specific territory in Germany that has a delineated territorial border
and a sense of group identity (Bavaria and eastern Germany respec-
tively). While Bavaria was the only large historical political entity
whose boundaries had survived the Second World War in 1945, the
borders of eastern Germany were defined in an even more robust
way: they belonged to a separate state until unification in 1990. The
historical experience of independent statehood for both Bavarians
and eastern Germans led to a strong sense of identity (even if East-
erners only really grasped this once their state had gone) that was
distinct from the rest of Germany.13
The CSU seeks, and the PDS sought, to mobilize this identity
and sense of difference in their respective territories by aiming to
10 C. Jeffery, ‘New Research Agendas on Regional Party Competition’, Regional and
Federal Studies, 19: 4–5 (2009), pp. 639–50.
11 M. Keating, ‘The Invention of Regions: Political Restructuring and Territorial
Government in Western Europe’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy,
15: 4 (1997), pp. 383–98; M. Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial
Restructuring and Political Change, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1998.
12 Keating, ‘The Invention of Regions’.
13 Sutherland, ‘ “Nation, Heimat, Vaterland” ’; Grix and Cooke, East German
Distinctiveness.
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represent and advance the interests of their regions in the FRG.While
this took the form of demanding greater decentralization of state
powers for the CSU, for the PDS this meant seeking a ‘better deal’ for
eastern Germans in the newly unified FRG.14 In accordance with
Keating’s classification, the CSU would therefore represent a mix of
bourgeois, right-wing and cultural regionalism that seeks to protect
local cultures, traditions and monies from threats of state centraliza-
tion and globalization. The PDS comprised a mix of left-wing and
conservative regionalism, by looking to defend eastern German tra-
ditions while at the same time endorsing themes of equality and
democracy. Another way to characterize these parties is by distinguish-
ing the autonomist regionalism of the CSU from the protectionist
regionalism of the PDS. As well as having different territorial aims, the
CSU and PDS are ideological opposites: while the CSU is a right-wing
Christian conservative party, the PDS was a left-wing (nominally social-
ist) party that has recently developed a more libertarian strand.
As well as seeking to understand what types of regionalisms exist,
it is also important to identify what the conditions of success are for
regionalist parties. Several scholars have endeavoured to identify
which factors are most important in determining the success of these
parties. To begin with, Tarrow usefully distinguishes between internal
and external resources that are available for regionalist mobiliza-
tion.15 Internal resources comprise a strong party leadership, a cohe-
sive and professional organization and group solidarity as well as a
sense of common purpose, while external resources include the
party’s access to the political system, the existence of influential allies
and partners, and the degree of political alignment in the system.
Müller-Rommel refines these factors to highlight the importance
of a strong membership base and an open and flexible party
organization, a skilled leader and a lack of factionalism as the main
internal resources for a regionalist party.16 With regard to external
resources, he identifies the presence of decentralized structures of
14 E. Hepburn, ‘The Neglected Nation: The CSU and the Territorial Cleavage in
Bavarian Party Politics’, German Politics, 17: 2 (2008), pp. 184–202; D. Hough and
M. Koss, ‘A Regional(ist) Party in Denial? The German PDS and its Arrival in Unified
Germany’, Regional and Federal Studies, 19: 4–5 (2009), pp. 579–93.
15 S. Tarrow, Power in Movements, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
16 F. Müller-Rommel, ‘Ethnoregionalist Parties in Western Europe: Theoretical
Considerations and Framework of Analysis’, in De Winter and Türsan, Regionalist
Parties in Western Europe.
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decision-making, a dealigned party system that is open to ‘new poli-
tics’ and the presence of influential pro-regionalist allies. These six
‘determinants of success’ were tested on regionalist parties operating
in several countries of Western Europe (including Belgium, Spain,
Italy, the UK and France) and summarized by De Winter.17 As stated
above, though, Germany is not on this list. We will try to explore
whether the variables identified by Tarrow and Müller-Rommel can
determine why regionalism remains such a successful movement in
Germany, and also whether factors beyond the Tarrow/Müller-
Rommel framework may be more help in explaining the success of
the CSU and PDS in Bavaria and eastern Germany, respectively.
SPECIAL REGIONS? BAVARIAN AND EAST GERMAN INTEGRATION
IN THE FRG
Although the German constitution does not grant any Land ‘special’
status in the way that, say, the Spanish or Italian ones do, it is clear
that both Bavaria and eastern Germany have unique histories that
require some sort of practical acknowledgement. According to the
official Bavarian state website, Bavaria constitutes ‘one of the oldest
European states’. Scholars have traced a long historical lineage, start-
ing with the establishment of a Bavarian dukedom in ad 554, and
later its transformation into a kingdom by the grace of Napoleon in
1806. After the Wars of German Unification of 1866–71, Bavaria
became absorbed into a German Empire dominated by Bismarck,
which created a strong sense of resentment of ‘Prussia’ that persists to
this day.18 This came to an end in November 1918 with the establish-
ment of a Bavarian Freistaat by Kurt Eisner’s Independent Socialist
Party, which terminated quickly and violently. This episode in Bavar-
ian history cemented a distrust of socialism, with Bavarians soon
going to the opposite extreme by supporting Hitler’s Nazi Party. After
the capitulation of the German army in 1945, Bavaria came under the
control of an American military government. The lack of a solid
17 L. De Winter, ‘Conclusion: A Comparative Analysis of the Electoral, Office and
Policy Success of Ethnoregionalist Parties’, in De Winter and Türsan, Regionalist Parties
in Western Europe.
18 S. Padgett and T. Burkett, Political Parties and Elections in West Germany: The Search
for a New Stability, London, C. Hurst, 1986, p. 115.
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German political structure at this time gave Bavaria the opportunity
to establish its autonomy by creating a Bavarian constitution that
celebrated Bavaria’s thousand-year history, tradition of statehood
and sense of identity.19 When Bavaria became a Land in the FRG in
1949, it was furnished with a constitutional court, government, par-
liament and second chamber, and at the same time was firmly rooted
in federal political structures through its representation in the
Bundesrat.
In constitutional terms, East Germany, on the other hand, does
not exist at all. There is no Land called ‘eastern Germany’, and it has
no direct political, economic or cultural representation. Indeed, fol-
lowing the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, it took a
mere 10 months to eradicate the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) from the political map completely. The GDR was replaced by
five new Länder and Berlin as Germany became one state again. East
Germans were, for the most part, happy that ‘their’ state had gone
and were looking forward to a peaceful and prosperous future in the
FRG. As is widely known, however, the process of integrating eastern
Germany into the federal republic has been anything other than
straightforward. Economic data from the east have been persistently
worse than in the west; unemployment rates are higher, levels of
economic growth are lower and easterners remain much less satisfied
both with the process and outputs of German democracy.20 Eastern
Germans also quickly became aware that political, economic and
cultural life in the new state worked to a western agenda, and in a
matter of months Easterners were articulating their unhappiness with
their respective positions in this new polity. Indeed, although there
was never any such thing as a ‘GDR identity’, once East Germany
ceased to exist Easterners did indeed come to identify with fellow
citizens who had lived there, been socialized into the GDR’s struc-
tures and had witnessed (from the inside, as it were) the process of
transformation that had followed its collapse.21 This disjointed and
19 P. James, The Politics of Bavaria, Aldershot, Avebury, 1995.
20 M. Münter and R. Sturm, ‘Economic Consequences of German Unification’,
German Politics, 11: 3 (2002), pp. 179–94; W. Gellner and G. Strohmeier, ‘The “Double”
Public: Germany after Reunification’, German Politics, 11: 3 (2002), pp. 59–82; R. J.
Dalton and S. Weldon, ‘Germans Divided? Political Culture in a United Germany’,
German Politics, 19: 1 (2010), pp. 9–23.
21 J. Grix, ‘East German Political Attitudes: Socialist Legacies v. Situational Factors:
A False Antithesis’, German Politics, 9: 2(2000), pp. 109–24.
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destabilizing process of integrating the two states was, when coupled
with the experience of living in the GDR, a strong facilitator of a
sense of eastern ‘differentness’ and the basis on which PDS success
was to be built.
THE CSU: AUTONOMIST REGIONALISM
Bavaria’s historical and cultural distinctiveness before the creation of
the FRG has had a significant impact on its post-war party system
development. In order to protect its special interests and identity,
Bavaria has consistently provided an independent voice in German
affairs, by advocating a more decentralized model of federalism as a
solution to Germany’s organizational difficulties.22 This position has
been consistently upheld by Bavaria’s ‘party of state’ – the CSU.
The CSU was established in 1945 following the collapse of the
Third Reich. Although a new party, the CSU embodied an important
strand of Bavarian Christian-conservative political thinking, whose
previous representatives had been the Bavarian Patriotic Party (BPP),
the Bavarian Centre Party and the Bavarian People’s Party (BVP) –
the latter of which had been active until the fall of the Weimar
Republic. The CSU was therefore part of a long political tradition
that emphasized Bavarian patriotism and Christian values. Because of
the importance of Bavarianism to the party’s self-understanding, the
first proposed name for the party was actually the Bavarian Christian
Social Union (although the prefix was abandoned to appease the
anti-regionalist US military government). In any case, the aims of the
CSU were clear: to protect Bavaria’s special interests, unique identity
and culture and political autonomy by supporting a strong type of
federalism based on the decentralization of powers, greater regional
policy autonomy and a powerful Bundesrat. The CSU constructs
Bavaria as a nation (Heimat) in its own right, and argues that this
specialness should be recognized in Germany.23
22 D. R. Dorondo, Bavaria and German Federalism. Reich to Republic, 1918–33, 1945–
49, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1992.
23 Sutherland, ‘ “Nation, Heimat, Vaterland” ’; G. Ford, ‘Constructing a Regional
Identity: The Christian Social Union and Bavaria’s Common Heritage, 1949–62’,
Contemporary European History, 16: 3 (2007), pp. 277–97; Hepburn, ‘The Neglected
Nation’.
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Following intense competition in the pursuit of these aims with a
nationalist rival, the Bayernpartei (BP), which entered the Bavarian
Landtag in 1954–57 and made a significant dent in CSU support, the
CSU then underwent a radical transformation in the 1950s and
1960s.24 It created a broad organizational sub-structure by setting up
local offices in almost every municipality, centralizing the party
machine, establishing a weekly party newspaper, the Bayernkurier, and
founding a party research institute, the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung in
Munich. The party’s reorganization allowed it to transform itself into
a modern catch-all party and win back its support. As a result, the
CSU has governed Bavaria since 1957 (and without coalition partners
from 1966 to 2008).
During the 1960s, the CSU solidified its support base through its
economic policies. The CSU implemented radical economic reforms
to hasten the post-war industrialization in Bavaria, which focused on
‘harmonizing progress with traditional structures’. This meant that
the sudden expansion of a modern industrial society would not
destroy Bavaria’s traditional economic sectors. Rather, the CSU
encouraged farmers, traders, artisans and small businesses to con-
tinue unchanged, and even introduced subsidies and tax concessions
for those who chose to continue the ‘old’ Bavarian way of life.25 The
CSU had to be skilful to appeal to two quite different clienteles – a
backward-looking, rural one and an emerging, more-progressive
urban group. Subsidizing the agricultural group would have left no
resources to develop a modern industrial base in Bavaria. The CSU
therefore cannily supported the development of the European
Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as it allowed the CSU to
pass the costs of agricultural support on to the European level while
developing high-tech industry in Bavaria. Performing this balancing
act proved to be a political masterstroke. The CSU’s role in managing
the Bavarian economy subsequently allowed it to accommodate
farmers and property-owners, as well as the new classes of blue-collar
24 A. Mintzel, ‘The Christian Social Union in Bavaria: Analytical Notes on its
Development, Role and Political Success’, in M. Kaase and K. von Beyme (eds),
Elections and Parties, London, Sage, 1978, p. 204.
25 A. Mintzel, ‘Political and Socio-Economic Developments in the Postwar Era: The
Case of Bavaria 1945–1989’, in K. Rohe (ed.), Elections, Parties and Political Traditions.
Social Foundations of German Parties and German Party Systems 1867–1987, New York and
Oxford, Berg, 1990.
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and white-collar workers that would form the electoral backbone of
the CSU’s success.
In addition to the CSU’s appeal to several social strata in Bavaria,
the CSU also sought to expand its support base to cover all of the
sub-regions in the Land. Bavaria contains three large sub-regional
cultures that date back to the mid-nineteenth century: Swabia, Fran-
conia and Old Bavaria. At first, the CSU focused on the Catholic
conservative heartland of Old Bavaria, which had a sense of national
identity that was resisted in the liberal Reich-oriented regions of
Swabia and Franconia.26 Yet the CSU looked to bridge the socio-
cultural (and confessional) divide between the patriotic Catholic
south and federalist Protestant north in its aim to become the domi-
nant party in a unified Bavaria.27 The CSU was able for the first time
ever to create a single Bavarian political culture while still acknowl-
edging the diversity of the historical sub-regional identities.28
An important appeal for the party was its strong leadership. Most
importantly, Franz Josef Strauss (fondly known by his initials FJS) was
the ‘man who for over a quarter of a century had been the
uncrowned king of Bavaria [who] was also described as the person-
ality who divided the Federal Republic more than any other German
politician: admired by some, feared by others’.29 FJS, whose father was
a member of the Bavarian BVP, became CSU general secretary in
1948, federal minister of defence in 1956–62, chairman of the CSU in
1961–88, federal minister of finance in 1966–69, president of the
Bundesrat in 1983–84 and minister-president of Bavarian from 1978
until his death in 1988. He is credited with modernizing the party in
the 1950s, developing the CSU’s and Bavaria’s image both at home
and abroad, and advancing the Doppelrolle of the party through his
influence in federal politics. FJS viewed himself ‘as a man of the
people . . . often putting in an appearance at the Munich Oktoberfest
26 C. Carl-Sime, ‘Bavaria, the CSU and the West German Party System’, West Euro-
pean Politics, 2 (1979), pp. 89–107; A. Mintzel, ‘Specificities of Bavarian Political
Culture’, in D. Berg-Schlosser and R. Rytlewski (eds), Political Culture in Germany,
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1993.
27 Ford, ‘Constructing a Regional Identity’.
28 Mintzel, ‘Specificities of Bavarian Political Culture’, p. 109; Sutherland ‘ “Nation,
Heimat, Vaterland” ’.
29 P. James, ‘Franz Josef Strauß: Lasting Legacy or Transitory Phenomenon?’,
German Politics, 7: 2 (1998), pp. 200–2.
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or at parties wearing fancy dress during the carnival season’.30 His
ebullience was also partly his failing. After being involved in a
number of political controversies, FJS never got the job he really
wanted: federal chancellor. When he stood in the 1980 election as the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/CSU candidate, many CDU
party members opined that the Social Democratic Party (SPD) can-
didate Helmut Schmidt would make a better chancellor, while
Strauss had to speak behind bullet-proof glass when making a cam-
paign tour of the Ruhr area.31
Clearly, the CSU did not seek to restrict its activities and demands
to the Bavarian party political arena, or to become a ‘provincial’ party
with little power as some of its predecessors (BPP and BVP) and its
early competitors (Bavarian Party) had. Instead, it developed a dual
role as both a Bavarian regionalist party and a German federalist
party. Through negotiations with the CDU in 1947–49, the CSU was
able to participate in federal politics as part of the Christian demo-
cratic parliamentary group, and to fill Cabinet posts in CDU/CSU
governments during 1949–69, 1982–98 and since 2005. At the same
time, the CSU has been able to maintain its full independence, which
is manifested in its separate party programmes and congresses, orga-
nizational and membership structures and the existence of a CSU
Landesgruppe in the Bundestag. Both parties agreed not to contest
elections outside their territories (Bavaria for the CSU and the rest of
Germany for the CDU), and the CSU became known as the Schwest-
erpartei (sister party) to the CDU. Mintzel has described the CSU’s
position as an autonomous Land party with a federal function as a
Doppelrolle.32 The fact that the CSU is a quasi-federal party allows it to
punch above its weight in the federal political arena. Its relationship
with the CDU endows it with a political significance that extends far
beyond Bavaria. Indeed, the CSU has long been the third political
force in federal politics.
The success of the CSU in transforming itself into an inter-
confessional, modern, professional Volkspartei (catch-all party), with
local organizations in almost every municipality in Bavaria and a
political reach that extends to Berlin, has meant that it has been able
to win on average 50–60 per cent of the popular vote in Land, federal
30 Ibid., p. 205
31 James, The Politics of Bavaria, p. 3.
32 Mintzel, ‘Political and Socio-Economic Developments in the Postwar Era’.
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and European elections since 1969. This has created enormous dif-
ficulties for other parties trying to break the CSU stronghold. In
particular, there is thus a lack of Bavarian identification with non-
CSU parties. The SPD, the Free Democratic Party of German (FDP)
and Greens have failed to articulate an alternative vision of Bavaria,
and to convince voters that they would stand up for Bavarian interests
in the FRG.33 In particular, the position of Bavaria’s main opposition
party, the SPD, is described as ‘hopeless’ by Mintzel.34 As a result,
state-wide parties have only been able to scrape together 30–40 per
cent of the vote in Bavarian elections, making little dent in the CSU’s
electoral capital.
Although the CSU lost its overall majority in the 2008 Land elec-
tion, which forced it into a coalition government with the FDP, this
was not due to any burgeoning support for state-wide parties such as
the SPD (whose share of the vote declined). Instead, the CSU’s
electoral decline (its vote share decreased from 60.7 per cent in the
2003 election to 43 per cent in 2008) may be attributable to the
success of a breakaway party of disillusioned supporters – the Freie
Wähler (Free Voters) party, which gained 11.1 per cent of the vote in
2008.35 One reason for the CSU’s poor results was the lack of strong
and inspiring leadership in the 2008 election, as the formidable and
popular Edmund Stoiber, who had been minister-president and party
chairman from 2002 to 2007, was replaced by two men – Günther
Beckstein as state premier and Erwin Huber as party chairman –
neither of whom was especially charismatic. Although the CSU now
has a new leader, Horst Seehofer, it is too soon to tell if and how the
CSU will be able to regain its disenchanted voters.
THE PDS: PROTECTIONIST REGIONALISM
The PDS grew out of a dictatorial and inherently anti-democratic
predecessor – the GDR’s Socialist Unity Party (SED). The SED was
formed in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in 1946 following a forced
33 E. Hepburn, Using Europe: Territorial Party Strategies in a Multi-Level System,
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010.
34 A. Mintzel, Die CSU-Hegemonie in Bayern: Strategie und Erfolg; Gewinner und Verlierer,
Passau, Wiss.-Verl. Rothe, 1999, p. 115.
35 P. James, ‘End of an Era? The Landtagswahl in Bavaria, September 2008’,
German Politics, 18: 1 (2009), pp. 103–9.
86 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
© The Authors 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition Ltd
merger between the Communist Party and the Social Democrats. It
governed the GDR continuously until March 1990, when it finally lost
its position of power in the first and last free elections that East
Germany experienced. The SED’s position as communism began to
crumble was, therefore, anything but advantageous. As the GDR
imploded in the weeks and months after the fall of the Berlin Wall in
November 1989, the party leaders began to grasp that radical changes
in ideology, organization and policy were necessary if the SED were to
survive in post-unification Germany. Indeed, survival – nothing more
– was the best option, and in late 1989 and early 1990 the SED set out
on an uneasy and disjointed process of reform with precisely this aim
in mind.
The SED quickly called an extraordinary conference for the 8–9
and 16–17 December 1989 to discuss the future of the party. Amidst
all of the confusion, one question rose above all others in importance
and came to dominate discussions: should the SED disband com-
pletely and re-convene as a different organization, under another
name, as free as possible from the ideological ballast of the GDR, or
should it reform itself (again perhaps under another name) in an
attempt to act as a bridge of continuity between the ‘old’ GDR and
the ‘new’ GDR that many believed was developing?36 The majority of
delegates opted for the latter option. On 17 December 1989, there-
fore, tired and dispirited delegates chose to adopt a new, transitional,
name – the SED/PDS.37
The lifespan of the SED/PDS was short: at the executive meeting
of 4 February 1990 the party was renamed again – this time simply to
the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). This, the leadership hoped,
would bring discussions about the PDS’s previous life as the SED to
an end; unsurprisingly, they were very much mistaken. If questions of
the future party name dominated early debates in the party, issues of
ideological orientation, programmatic purity and policy detail soon
took them over. Programmes were fought over and discussed in
impassioned debates, ensuring that policy development was both
piecemeal and, for the most part, decidedly disjointed. Communists
argued with social democrats, Marxists with socialists. Such was the
36 F. Oswald, The Party that Came Out of the Cold War: The Party of Democratic Socialism
in United Germany, London, Praeger, 2002.
37 P. Barker, ‘From the SED to the PDS: Continuity or Renewal?’, in German
Monitor: The Party of Democratic Socialism. Modern Post-Communism or Nostalgic Populism?,
Amsterdam, Rodopi B.V, 1998, vol. 42, pp. 1–17.
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ideological diversity evident in the debate that not only was it hard for
the leadership to steer, but also at times it was difficult even to follow
what exactly was going on.
Programmatic development subsequently took place in a series of
waves through the 1990s; initially it remained quite rigid and the
focus was on distancing the party from the excesses of the GDR in
1990, before offering more space to ideological conservatives and
critics of (west German) capitalism in the years between 1991 and
1998. This was the era of formulaic compromises before a group of
‘modern socialists’, keen on stabilizing the PDS as a reforming force
to the left of the SPD, came out on top in the run-up to the 1998
federal election.38 Thoughts of reviewing and renewing the party
programme following that election prompted more introversion and
introspection, leading to an eventual crisis after 2002 as the party
slipped out of the Bundestag before (unexpectedly) returning as the
Left Party in 2005.
The PDS’s programmatic aims through the 1990s were subse-
quently twofold. On the one hand it sought to open itself up to all
progressive radicals and to offer a prospective home to all elements of
the anti-capitalist left. Inclusion – stretching from communists to
social democrats (around the short-lived ‘Social Democratic Plat-
form’) – was the aim. On the other hand, the PDS realized that it
would have to come to some sort of programmatic accommodation
with the structures and processes of Germany’s social market
economy in order to be allowed to exist by the constitutional watch-
dog, the Bundesverfassungsschutz. It could no longer condemn capi-
talism as being purely evil, and it subsequently accepted the rule of
law and parliamentary democracy, and rejected the democratic sham
that had existed in the GDR. It had to find a way of being construc-
tively critical while being unambiguously clear that it did not want to
overthrow Germany’s constitutional settlement – no easy task.
In the months and years immediately following unification, the
PDS had no coherent political agenda; its programme was both vague
and at times contradictory, and it appeared unable to influence the
wider political environment around it. It certainly seems plausible
that, had eastern Germany blossomed into the ‘flourishing economic
landscape’ that Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl had promised, the
38 D. Hough, J. Olsen and M. Koss, The Left Party in Contemporary German Politics,
London, Palgrave, 2007.
88 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
© The Authors 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition Ltd
PDS would have drifted, as the cadre gradually died away, into non-
existence. Yet, by the end of 1991, and increasingly thereafter, the
fallout from unification was beginning to disillusion many eastern
Germans, and new and unexpected electoral potential was develop-
ing for the party. The perceived arrogance of western politicians, the
apparent annexation (although initially approved) of eastern
Germany and the blatant lack of regard for most things ‘East
German’ led many to feel that they were strangers in their own land.39
The PDS sensed that things might not be as bleak for the party as was
first believed, and sought to develop a new role for itself as the
articulator of dissatisfied sections of the eastern German electorate.40
The PDS became – perhaps more through luck than judgement – the
representative of disgruntled citizens in eastern Germany. The effects
of having lived under state socialism, as well as having experienced
the difficult transition from socialism to capitalism, prompted a sig-
nificant number of Easterners to re-identify with both eastern
Germany and with other eastern Germans – and with the PDS as a
political voice, albeit a rather peculiar one. The enduring material
and psychological differences between eastern and western Germany
that the PDS was able to articulate helped it expand on its steady
bedrock of former functionary support. The PDS was seen to have
gone through the same difficult process of getting used to, and being
coldly shunned by, the new state that many Easterners perceived
themselves as also having undergone. It subsequently became the
mouthpiece of the disaffected in the new Länder.
By the mid-1990s, the SPD realized both that the PDS was going to
be a long-term presence and also that it was slowly developing more
pragmatic and less ideologically extreme programmatic stances.
Indeed, those on the left of the SPD saw the option of bringing the
PDS into the coalition equation in the sub-state arena in eastern
Germany as being an ideal opportunity to broaden their own strate-
gic options.41 The SPD in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt was
tempted to take the PDS up on its offer of acting as a support party to
the SPD/Green coalition. Controversial though this arrangement
was, the government performed reasonably well and by 2001 the PDS
39 G. K. Roberts, ‘ “Emigrants in Their Own Country”: German Reunification and
its Political Consequences’, Parliamentary Affairs, 44 (1991), pp. 373–88.
40 Hough ‘“Made in Eastern Germany” ’.
41 C. Lees, ‘Bringing the PDS into the Coalition Equation’, German Politics, 4: 1
(1995), pp. 150–4.
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was in government – and this time in a genuine coalition – in two
other eastern states (Mecklenburg Western Pomerania and Berlin).
Even if it was virtually non-existent in the west, the PDS was on the
road to being a ‘normal’ party in the east. It was now polling between
15 and 25 per cent of the vote, and for a significant number of
easterners – supporters and critics alike – it had become a normal
actor in eastern German politics. The PDS’s poor electoral perfor-
mance in the federal election of 2002 (4 per cent, and only two seats
in the federal parliament) was undoubtedly a setback, but the party
remained a clear, articulate and effective representative of eastern
German-ness in each of the eastern state parliaments. This continues
to be the case now, even if the PDS has metamorphosed into a
state-wide actor in the form of the Left Party.42
CONDITIONS OF REGIONALIST SUCCESS IN GERMANY
Regionalist parties in Bavaria and eastern Germany have subse-
quently exhibited remarkable resilience and growth in post-war
Germany. Not only have they established a permanent core voter
base in their ‘homelands’, but they have also extended their political
activities throughout the rest of Germany. This is a remarkable
achievement for political actors representing a narrow set of regional
interests in a country so seemingly opposed to ‘particularism’. In this
section we seek to determine what the main factors explaining the
success of these parties have been. As stated above, various determi-
nants of success have been identified by scholars of regionalist parties
focusing on Western European states. To recap, these are: a strong
party leadership, a cohesive organization, group solidarity, party
access to the political system, the existence of influential allies and
partners, and the stability of political alignments in the party system.43
To what extent do these variables correspond to the success of
regionalist parties in Germany?
To begin with internal resources, strong and charismatic leader-
ship appears to be an important aspect in both of the cases. The
CSU has always been heavily identified with its leading politicians –
42 Hough et al., The Left Party in Contemporary German Politics.
43 Tarrow, Power in Movements; Müller-Rommel, ‘Ethnoregionalist Parties in
Western Europe’.
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especially FJS, who was seen as the father-figure of the CSU. Although
FJS’s immediate successors, Max Streibl and Theo Waigel, were not
charismatic enough to ‘take over the “myth” created by Strauss’,
Edmund Stoiber – who led the party and the region from 2002 until
2007 – was able to develop a strong leadership position, allowing him
regularly to win 60 per cent of the vote in Bavarian elections.44 The
PDS, on the other hand, would not have survived without the sharp
tongue and quick-witted charisma of Berlin lawyer Gregor Gysi. Gysi
rose rapidly through the party ranks in the final months of 1989, and
his ability to enthuse and energize the PDS’s grassroots membership
was vital in keeping the party together in 1989, 1990 and 1991.
Remarkably, Gysi also had the ability to speak not only to party
members, but also to the wider electorate. He regularly painted a
picture of western German dominance over a beleaguered and put-
upon eastern German citizenry, and he quickly became one of the
FRG’s most recognizable political figures. Indeed, Gysi still remains
leader of the Left Party’s parliamentary party in the federal legisla-
ture, and his mastery of the one-liner did much to help the PDS shed
its image as a party of yesteryear.
With regard to the second variable, that of party organization,
many commentators see the CSU’s organizational transformation in
the mid-1950s as a key to its success. In particular, the decision to
overhaul the party’s structures and create a professional bureaucracy
allowed the CSU to replace many of the older clerical conservatives
with a younger generation of committed, pragmatic politicians.45 The
PDS has also benefited from being, for much of the 1990s at least, the
party with the most members in eastern Germany. It also cleverly used
its ageing membership to its advantage, with many PDS supporters
who had taken early retirement putting in hours and hours of work
knocking on doors and distributing information. Indeed, the ‘Turbo-
rentner’, the groups of highly motivated ‘turbo-pensioners’ who will-
ingly manned information stands and supported the party’s events
were the envy of all of the other parties who competed in the eastern
states.
44 C. Wagemann, ‘Once Again the Deviant Case? Why the Christlich-Soziale Union
Only Partially Fulfils the Image of an “Alpine Populist Party” ’, in D. Caramani and
Y. Mény (eds), Challenges to Consensual Politics: Democracy, Identity and Populist Protest in
the Alpine Region, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2005, p. 180.
45 Ford, ‘Constructing a Regional Identity, p. 286.
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The third internal factor identified by Tarrow and Müller-Rommel
is that of group solidarity. In the case of the CSU, early divisions
between a more liberal-conservative federalist strand and a more
radical-conservative autonomist strand in the 1950s caused many
members of the CSU to move to the Bayernpartei, thus guaranteeing
the BP’s success in the 1954 election. Since the transformation in the
late 1950s, though, there have been very few signs of factionalism. In
the case of the PDS, there is more evidence of divergent opinions
within the party, and this indeed almost caused the party to implode
in 2002–3. During the 1990s – the period when it was most obviously
a regionalist party – the importance of defending eastern German
interests consistently prompted politicians and members alike to
present a united front to the outside world. Indeed, the PDS
struggled in the early 2000s – precisely the era when it could not show
genuine group solidarity.
Moving on to external resources, the fourth variable – party access
to the political system – has not been a problem for regionalist parties
in Germany as the federal structure of the state has created decen-
tralized structures of decision-making that have enabled parties to
enter parliament and government at the Land level (as long as they
overcome the ‘5 per cent’ hurdle to winning seats in the Landtag).
Both the CSU and PDS have entered regional parliaments as well as
regional governments in Bavaria (for the CSU) and Berlin and
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (for the PDS).46 A fifth factor identified
in the literature is the existence of influential allies. Here, however,
neither the CSU nor PDS has engaged with other regionalist parties
or pro-regionalist allies (as stipulated by Müller-Rommel), although
both have engaged in partnerships with state-wide parties (see
below). Finally, scholars have pointed to the importance of a
dealigned party system that is open to ‘new politics’ for regionalist
party success. While this was not a condition of success for the CSU,
which began winning absolute majorities during a period in which
the German party was highly stable, the dealignment of party politics
following reunification was a factor in the success of the PDS as it
made use of the virgin electoral territory of the five eastern Länder
and Berlin.
46 The PDS has, as has already been noted, also acted as a support party in
Saxony-Anhalt (1994–2002). The PDS’s successor, the Left Party, also entered govern-
ment in another eastern state, Brandenburg, in 2009.
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Clearly, some factors identified by Tarrow and Müller-Rommel
hold more explanatory power than others. Leadership, party organi-
zation, lack of factionalism and decentralized structures of decision-
making were important elements (to varying extents) in the rise of
both the CSU and PDS in their home territories. Yet there are other
aspects to the success of regionalist parties in Germany that these
authors have not accounted for. In particular, the main determinant
of regionalist party success in the FRG appears to be the ability of
parties tomaintain both a regionalist and a federalist orientation. The
CSU and PDS place(d) great importance on having influence on
federal politics and shaping the political agenda. This aspect of the
parties’ goals is especially important in understanding why the PDS
and CSU, as ‘regionalist parties’, must also develop a federalist orien-
tation in order to succeed in the interlocking structures of the FRG.
This two-tiered functioning involves the differentiation of strategies at
the Land and federal levels, electoral expansion outside their home
territories, robust campaigning at the Land and federal levels and
the development of partnerships/coalitions in national politics. In the
case of the latter, the CSU has successfully projected itself on to the
German political stage through its federal alliance with the CDU. At
the same time, the CSU can claim to be the only party representing
Bavaria’s special interests. The CSU is first and foremost a Bavarian
party whose success has to a great extent been based on the party’s
direct identification with the Bavarian Land. Onemight consider that,
had the CSU notmade a pact with the CDU in the immediate post-war
period, it is likely that it would have become merely another local
Bavarian party and Christian democratic competitor to the CDU. The
PDS successfully argued that it represented the sentiments, feelings
and interests of a significant proportion of Easterners who felt aban-
doned by the ‘western’ parties. The PDS was the self-styled voice of
eastern German differentness. Indeed, even Easterners who had no
truck with the PDS’s history and/or its socialism often begrudgingly
accepted that it was skilled at fighting ‘the eastern German cause’.
In addition to building both a regionalist and a federalist profile,
another factor for success as revealed in the case studies was the
inability or weakness of state-wide parties to play the ‘regionalist’
card. In Bavaria, state-wide parties have been constantly hampered by
their inability to shake off the popular perception that they were
foreign (un-Bavarian) parties ultimately controlled by Bonn/Berlin.
This phenomenon was replicated perfectly in eastern Germany
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through the 1990s. While some parties – such as the SPD and Greens
– have made concerted efforts to develop a more territorial profile
(and in the case of the SPD to try and portray themselves as a
Bavarian party standing up for Bavarian interests), others – such as
the FDP – have opposed regional ‘particularism’ in any form and are
staunchly against recognizing the ‘specialness’ of Bavaria within the
FRG. This inability to become distinctive Bavarian parties has ham-
pered the SPD, Greens and FDP in the polls. The same dynamic also
existed in the post-1990 eastern states, particularly after the SPD
prohibited former SED members from even joining the party in 1989
and 1990. All parties looked to expand their membership bases and
to support Easterners in rising through their parties, but none was
able to develop a convincing territorial narrative of having experi-
enced the rapid and in many ways tumultuous transformation of the
GDR into eastern Germany in the way that the PDS could and did.
These additional variables for explaining the success of the CSU
and PDS may also mean that German regionalist parties are slightly
different from other regionalist parties in Western Europe (especially
from those identified by De Winter and Türsan in their 1998 edited
collection). In particular, the PDS and CSU can be categorized as both
regionalist and German parties. Neither of them wishes to deny the
existence of the German state; instead, they want to gain more rep-
resentation of the interests of their territories within it.
CONCLUSION
Although Germany’s territorial integrity may not have been threat-
ened by an independence-seeking nationalist party in the post-war
period, the political and economic structures of federalism have been
challenged by two regionalist parties with the aim of either seeking
greater regional autonomy, or demanding a better economic deal for
the region. The German party system has enabled one of these
parties – the CSU – to become the third-largest political force in the
FRG, while the lack of entrenched voter alignments following reuni-
fication in 1990 gave the PDS a chance to become one of the largest
political forces in eastern Germany. As a result of their electoral
success, German regionalist parties have been able, in their different
ways, to influence politics at the regional and federal level in order to
represent the distinct needs of their territorial constituencies.
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Regionalist parties have become key players in both regional and
federal party systems, in some cases (as with the CSU) with direct
control over policy-making through federal government ministerial
posts, and in other cases (PDS), sufficient electoral success or influ-
ence in the party system to shape the German political agenda. These
are no small accomplishments for any regionalist party.
This article has focused on the main factors explaining the success
of these parties in the FRG. We tested a number of hypotheses put
forward by Tarrow and Müller-Rommell regarding the internal and
external resources necessary for regionalist party success. We found
that strong leadership was an particularly important factor, whereby
the shrewd and charismatic Franz Josef Strauss and Gregor Gysi were
especially adept at arousing deep emotions among the Bavarian and
eastern German electorate, constructing an image of Bavaria
and eastern Germany that resonated with the voters, and seeking to
stake out a place for Bavarian and eastern German interests in federal
politics. A second important factor was organizational strength and
the consolidation of a core membership base, which hastened the
CSU’s transition to a catch-all party in the late 1950s and the PDS’s
impressive growth in the 1990s. The existence of regional electoral
arenas also enabled the two parties to gain a foothold at this level
(which has been a problem for regionalist parties in, say, centralized
France). Yet, two of the key determinants of these parties’ success
were found outside this body of literature. First, the expansion, con-
solidation and influence of these parties had much to do with their
ability to develop a federal profile in addition to their regionalist
character. A second factor was the inability of state-wide parties to
compete with the CSU and PDS in their home territories. Parties such
as the SPD, CDU, FDP and Greens were unable develop a convincing
territorial narrative of Bavaria or eastern Germany, or to position
themselves as standing up for the interests of these regions.
At the same time, we found that there are also important differ-
ences between the two parties in how they have pursued and main-
tained their success. While the CSU developed a partnership with
the CDU in the early years of the federal republic at a time when the
German party was just taking shape, the PDS was a latecomer to the
German political scene and did not have the same opportunities to
develop a similar type of alliance with, say, the SPD (whereby the PDS
could have restricted its activities to the eastern Länder while the SPD
could have focused on the west). Instead, the PDS – realizing the
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limitations of being able to represent only one territorial constitu-
ency – forged an alliance with the West German Electoral Alternative
for Labour and Social Justice (WASG) to become a pan-German party
fighting federal elections. The two parties also vary in the way in
which they have captured the vote in their respective territories: while
the PDS articulated a discourse of exclusion and dominance by the
west, the CSU focused on its entitlement to special treatment and
influence in the FRG due to its historical traditions of statehood,
cultural identity and economic might. This latter factor, of course,
relates to the ideological profile and core demands of the parties
whereby the CSU has developed an autonomist regionalism based on
a historical-cultural construction of the region or nation while the
PDS has advanced a protectionist regionalism focused on strength-
ening the socio-economic status of the region.
The changing nature of the German party system has provided
these two parties with a number of opportunities as well as chal-
lenges. PDS politicians must now find a programmatic and strategic
compromise with those from the WASG within the new Left Party,
ensuring that recent electoral successes in the western states are
maintained without neglecting the eastern German heartland. For
the CSU, its loss of votes to the Free Voters Party during the 2008
election, which forced it into a governing coalition with the Free
Democrats and damaged its relationship with the CDU, constitutes a
new and uncharted phase in its history. The CSU must find a way to
re-energize its image to appeal to young voters who were disen-
chanted with the party’s traditionalist message, its weak leadership
and its recent policy debacles. Both parties therefore have to consider
how to adapt their message to address the pan-German (indeed,
pan-European) problems of electoral volatility, disenfranchisement
and popular distrust of mainstream politics. Despite these setbacks,
the electoral and political success of these parties puts to rest the
hypothesis that regionalist parties are inconsequential ‘niche’ actors
whose demise is an inevitable consequence of modernization.47 As
this article has shown, territory and regionalism are, and will remain,
remarkably resilient mobilizing issues in post-war Germany.
47 S. M. Lipset, Consensus and Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology, New Brunswick, NJ,
Transaction, 1985; B. M. Meguid, ‘Competition between Unequals: The Role of Main-
stream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success’, American Political Science Review, 99: 3
(2005), pp. 347–59.
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